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CARTIER, LTD. v. CAMMACK
ATTACHMENT AND GARNISHMENT OF THE
CONTENTS OF SAFE DEPOSIT BOXES
Cartier, Ltd. v. Cammack1
An attachment in the Superior Court of Baltimore City
was laid in the hands of a local banking corporation, as
garnishee, on original process against a non-resident debtor.
The garnishee pleaded that it had in its hands only eighteen
cents to the credit of the defendant, and also that the defen-
dant had leased a safe deposit box in its vaults, but that
the bank had no knowledge of its contents nor any proper
way of determining what they were. Then upon petition
by the plaintiffs the garnishee bank was required to show
cause why an order should not be passed directing the
sheriff to enter the safe deposit box and take possession of
the contents, the garnishee filed a pleading acquiescing in
whatever order the Court should make. It was held, that
the contents of the safe deposit box are subject to garnish-
ment and ordered, that the sheriff open it and take posses-
sion of all attachable property belonging to the defendant.
This appears to be the first time2 any court of Maryland
has been presented with the question of the attachability
of the contents of a safe deposit box, but several other
states have considered the question and most of them have
ruled as the Maryland court did. As will be seen, it makes
a difference if the creditor tries to reach the debtor's prop-
erty by direct attachment or through the help of the bank
as garnishee.
The subject has attracted the attention of many writers,'
because a nice question of personal property law is pre-
sented when the contents of the box are attempted to be
reached by garnishment. Are the contents of the box in
the possession of the garnishee?4 The familiar situation in
which the patron has one key and the bank the other, both
'Daily Record, Dec. 2, 1952.
2In DeBearn v. Winans, 119 Md. 390, 86 A. 1044 (1913), the writ of
attachment was laid in the hands of the debtor's surety, who in answer to
interrogatories had described the securities of the debtor held by the surety
in a safe deposit box. It was held that this was a sufficient attachment. The
present discussion is concerned with an actual taking of possession under
a writ of attachment directed either in personam to the bank as garnishee
or in rem to the sheriff against the contents of a safe deposit box.
815 Banking L. J. 559 (1898) ; 21 Boston U. L. Rev. 528 (1941) ; 73 Law
J. 443 (1932) ; 10 Mich. L. Rev. 651 (1912) ; 7 Va. L. Rev. 204 (1920) ; and
others cited in the following notes.
IMd. Code (1951), Art. 9, Secs. 10, 15, 16 and 30, use the words "in the
hands of", "in his possession or charge", "in his hands" and "in whose
hands", respectively.
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of which are required to release the lock, makes it difficult
to say who has possession. Two states have ruled firmly
against garnishment solely upon the ground that the con-
tents of a safe deposit box are not "in the hands of" the
bank.5 This conclusion seems questionable in view of the
fact that the bank can and does drill through the tumblers
for the patron who has lost his key and for the bank itself
when the patron is in arrears in payment for the use of
the box.
Several courts have allowed garnishment on the ground
that the bank has possession, without discussing the limita-
tions on that possession which have concerned other courts.'
The North Dakota court refused to consider the problem as
involving possession of the contents but held that it was
enough that the property inside the box belonged to the
debtor.7
Usually the decisions in the attachment cases have been
made on the basis of the legal relationship between bank
and patron previously determined in suits to recover from
the bank the value of property alleged to have been stolen
from the box. When in this situation the court has declared
the bank to be a lessor and has consequently refused re-
covery to a plaintiff patron, it has followed that declared
relationship into the attachment cases and refused garnish-
ment, for of course a lessor does not have possession of the
leased premises.8 However, the great weight of authority
is that the transaction is a bailment for hire: the bailor
patron can recover from the bailee bank, and attachment
5Medlyn v. Ananieff, 126 Conn. 169, 10 A. 2d 367 (1939), discussed in
3 U. Detroit L. J. 218-20 (1940), and People v. Mercantile Safe Deposit
Company, 159 App. Dlv. 98, 143 N. Y. S. 849 (1913), where the court said
that a safe deposit company had no more possession of or control over the
securities contained in a safe deposit box than a landlord has over securities
in a safe belonging to one of his tenants contained in the private office of
the tenant. See other New York cases, infra, n. 16, where direct attachment
was successful.
IOrchard & Wilhelm Co. v. North, 125 Neb. 723, 251 N. W. 895 (1933);
Wineman v. Clover Farms Dairy, 168 Miss. 583, 151 So. 749 (1934), noted,
6 Miss. L. J. 438 (1934) ; Texltte, Inc. v. Liberty State Bank, 150 S. W. 2d
822 (Tex. Civ. App., 1941) (the box was empty) ; and Blanks v. Radford,
188 S. W. 2d 879 (Tex. Civ. App., 1945).7 O'Connor v. McManus, 71 N. D. 88, 299 N. W. 22, 24 (1941), where the
court, saying, "It Is inconceivable that the law would permit a judgment
debtor to convert his assets into bonds and stocks and even currency,
sequester them in a safety deposit box, and laugh at the sheriff..." refused
to consider who had possession, and held that it is enough that the con-
tents of the box belong to the debtor. It should be emphasized that the
creditor was proceeding by garnishment.8 Dupont v. Moore, 86 N. H. 254, 166 A. 417 (1933) ; Tow v. Evans, 194
Ga. 160, 20 S. E. 2d 922 (1942) ; Wells v. Cole, 194 Minn. 275, 260 N. W.
520 (1935), noted, 19 Minn. L. Rev. 810 (1935), 3 U. Chicago L. Rev. 147
(1935), 21 Cornell L. Q. 325 (1936), and 21 Iowa L. Rev. 641 (1936).
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through garnishment of the bank is lawful,9 a creditor of
a bailor having the legal right to terminate the bailment.
A firm exception is Pennsylvania, which because of the
wording of its attachment statute will not allow either
direct attachment or garnishment,"0 although it long ago
decided that the contents of a safe deposit box are held by
the bank as bailee. The Illinois cases are inconclusive."
Michigan was listed by the Maryland court as having ruled
against garnishment, but because of strong dicta in the
Michigan opinion there would seem to be a great possi-
bility that there will be an affirmative decision when a
proper case is presented. 2
The tendency of the more recent opinions is to follow
broad principles rather than to base the holding on the
status of the bank as bailee. The Maryland court declared:
".. . it is hardly in accord with justice that a non-
resident or absconding debtor should, by the simple
device of hiding property in a safe deposit box, be able
to evade the claims of his creditors, when such property
9 Trowbridge v. Spinning, 23 Wash. 48, 62 P. 125 (1900) ; Washington
Loan & Trust Co. v. Susquehanna Coal Co., 26 App. D. C. 149 (1905);
Tillinghast v. Johnson, 34 R. I. 136, 82 A. 788 (1912), noted, 10 Mich. L.
Rev. 651 (1912) ; West Cache Sugar Co. v. Hendrickson, 56 Utah 327, 190
P. 946, 11 A. L. R. 216 (1920); Rabiste v. Southern, 300 Mo. 417, 254
S. W. 166 (1923); and Farmers' Savings Bank v. Roth, 195 Ia. 185, 191
N. W. 987 (1923).
10 Trainer v. Saunders, 250 Pa. 451, 113 A. 681, 19 A. L. R. 861 (1921),
although frequently cited in support of attachment, was an execution on
ft. fa. The court has not deviated from its position taken in ,Gregg v. Hilson,
8 Phila. Rep. 91 (Pa., 1871), that the contents of a safe deposit box cannot
be attached under the Pennsylvania statute, either directly or by garnish-
ment. Pennsylvania is solicitous of its bankers; 70 U. Pa. L. Rev. 112
(1922), in discussing the Trainer case raised the question of the protection
of the bailee bank's interest in ,the attached property and insisted that
only the bailor's reversionary interest should be subjected to the creditor's
demand. See the interesting decision in Williams v. Ricca, 324 Pa. 33, 187
A. 722 (1936), where attachment by garnishment was stopped upon a rule
by the debtor upon the garnishee to show cause, but before the debtor could
open the box, the creditor had a ft. fa. issued, and prevailed. The result
depended on the wording of the statutes involved.
1National Safe Deposit Co. v. Stead, 250 Ill. 584, 95 N. E. 973 (1911),
aff'd. 232 U. S. 58 (1914), was cited by the Maryland court in the instant
case in support of its decision, but it merely upheld an Illinois statute
requiring the sealing of safe deposit boxes for a limited time after the
death of the patron. In Morris v. Beatty, 390 Ill. 568, 62 N. E. 2d 478
(1945), the court avoided ruling directly on (the question, but because it
held the garnishee not liable to creditors for allowing the debtor access to
the box, possibly Illinois must be considered contra. See 4 John Marshall
L. Q. 535 (1939). The Morris case is discussed in 23 Chicago-Kent L. Rev.
182 (1945), and 24, ibid., 196 (1946), and also in 43 Mich. L. Rev. 792 (1945).
1
2 First National Bank in Mt. Clemens v. Croman, 288 Mich. 370, 284 N. W.
912 (1939). The contents of the box were assumed to be garnishable on
the basis of some of the cases herein cited, but the proceedings were defec-
tive because of the lack of a necessary party, i.e. - one of the box holders.
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is of a kind which, if outside the box or in the hands
of proper garnishees, would clearly be subject to ex-
ecution." '
The Court in passing mentioned that in Maryland the
bank has been held to be a bailee" of the contents of a safe
deposit box, and it is perhaps worthy of note that it is only
when dealing with the familiar bailment situation that the
courts have felt free to base their decisions on the high
ground of abstract justice; this tendency has not been fol-
lowed in any state that has held the bank to be a lessor of
its boxes.
It has been strenuously argued 5 that it is manifestly
unfair to place on the bank the duties and liabilities of a
garnishee of property of which it knows nothing and with
which in the regular course of events it would have nothing
to do. Direct attachment of the debtor's property in the
safe deposit box would not only relieve the bank of this
unwanted responsibility but would also avoid the hazards
to garnishment as outlined above. New York and Missis-
sippi have ruled in favor of direct attachment." That it
has been so seldom attempted is probably a consequence
of the necessity of serving interrogatories on the bank in
the first place to discover what credits of the debtor are
there available for attachment and of garnishing the bank
to reach the debtor's account.17 There seems to be no com-
pelling reason why direct attachment should be unavailable
to a creditor, 8 unless a court should find that it lacks power
Daily Record, Dec. 2, 1952.
Security Storage Co. v. Martin, 144 Md. 536, 125 A. 449 (1924) ; Takoma
Park Bank v. Abbott, 179 Md. 249, 19 A. 2d 169 (1941).
1522 Yale L. J. 416 (1913).
'16 Carples v. Cumberland Coal & Iron Co., 240 N. Y. 187, 148 N. E. 185,
39 A. L. R. 1211 (1925), noted, 99 Cent. L. J. 40 (1926), which overrides a
lower court decision contra in Stebli Silks Corp. v. Diamond, 122 Misc. Rep.
666, 204 N. Y. S. 542 (1924) ; the Carples case was followed in Central
Savings Bank v. Neuville, 56 N. Y. S. 2d 743 (Sup. Ct. N. Y., 1945). Jackson
State Nat. Bank v. Polk, 35 So. 2d 430 (Miss., 1948).
17 Rhynhart, Attachments in the People's Court of Baltimore City, 14 Md.
L. Rev. 235, 262 (1954), discusses attachment of the contents of a safe
deposit box by garnishment and at 266 sets out a plea to be used by the
garnishee bank in the case of a box with joint access by the debtor and
another.
IsIn De Bearn v. De Bearn, 119 Md. 418, 84 A. 1049 (1913), a case that
grew out of the same set of facts as In De Bearn v. Winans, supra, n. 2, 425,
the court stated:
"... of course the sheriff could not have broken Into the vaults of the
Safe Deposit Co. in order to levy on (the bonds)." Parenthetical ma-
terial supplied.
This is pure dictum, and the court gave no reason for making this observa-
tion; furthermore, the court In the instant case ordered the sheriff to do
this very breaking.
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to direct its officer to open the box in the vaults of the
bank or that the attachment statutes will not permit this
remedy.
It must be remembered that attachment and procedures
in aid thereof are purely statutory. Article 9 of Flack's
1951 Annotated Code of Maryland is the comprehensive
authority for attachment in Maryland. In 1951, a new sec-
tion of Article 11, Banks and Trust Companies, was enacted,
which seems to permit attachment of the contents of safe
deposit boxes.
"No banking institution doing business in this State
shall be required to recognize, or take any action with
respect to, any claim to a deposit or to money or prop-
erty in its hands or contained in a safe deposit box,
adverse to the interests of any person, corporation or
other legal entity, appearing on its records as entitled
to receive from it such deposit, money or property or
a part thereof, except that if there is served upon such
banking institution a restraining order, injunction,
attachment, garnishment, order to show cause, or other
order, or decree, issued or entered by a court in this
State in an action, to which the adverse claimant is a
party, involving a claim to the whole or a part of such
deposit, money, or property, then such institution may,
or to the extent required thereby shall, impound and
withhold all or any part of such deposit, money, or
property subject to further order of the Court and with-
out any liability on its part to anyone for so doing."' 9
This section seems to lay greater duties upon the bank
than were laid upon it by the court in the instant case,
where the order was issued to the sheriff to open the box
and take custody of the contents subject to further order,
even though the attachment had been laid in the hands of
the bank as garnishee. It should be noted that the clause
freeing the bank of liability "to anyone for so doing" may
not be quite so broad as it seems. What if the patron has
placed in his box the valuables of another? Will the bank
be protected if it impounds them?
Does this section cover direct attachment? A writ of
attachment commands the sheriff to seize the goods and
keep them, whereas this statute seems to contemplate that
the bank do these things if there is served upon it "an
19Md. Code (1951), Art. 11, Sec. 103.
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attachment". Possibly, with the convenience and practi-
cality of garnishment, this question need not come up in
Maryland, but if it does, it would seem to be necessary
to decide if under the provisions of Article 9 rather than of
the above section of Article 11.
RIGHT OF REMOVAL WHERE
THIRD PARTY IMPLEADED
Elliott v. Larrimore'
The Plaintiff, Mildred Larrimore, was injured when
the automobile, in which she was a passenger, ran off the
road and struck a pole of one of the Appellees, the Con-
solidated Gas, Electric Light and Power Company of Balti-
more (hereinafter referred to as "Gas Company"). The
vehicle was owned by the Defendant-Appellant, Harry
Elliott, and at the time of the accident was being driven by
his wife, Norma Elliott, the other Defendant-Appellant.
Suit was brought in the Circuit Court for Anne Arundel
County, alleging negligence on the part of Defendant-Ap-
pellants Elliotts. The Elliotts, with leave of Court, filed
a third-party complaint 2 against the Gas Company, alleg-
ing that the negligence of the company in erecting an un-
lighted pole so that it jutted, in part, onto the highway,
contributed to the happening of the accident. Thereafter
the Elliotts, without notice to the Gas Company, filed a
suggestion for removal pursuant to the constitutional3 pro-
vision. An order was passed removing the case. On the
day following this order, the Gas Company4 filed a motion
seeking a rescission thereof. After a hearing on the motion,
'203 Md. 526, 101 A. 2d 817 (1954).
Under Rule 4, General Rules of Practice and Procedure, Part Two,
subd. III.
'Maryland Constitution, Art. IV, Sec. 8, which provides, in part:
"... upon suggestion in writing under oath of either of the parties
to said proceedings, that such party cannot have a fair and Impartial
trial in the Court in which the same may be pending, the said Court
shall order . . . (,the case) . . . to be transmitted to some other
Court ......
4Note that General Rules of Practice and Procedure, supra, n. 2, by
Rule 7, superseded Md. Code (1951), Art. 26, Sec. 50, which was the statu-
tory predecessor of Rule 4, under which the Gas Company was brought In.
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